

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 VIENNA 02543 01 OF 03 211656Z

50

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 ACDE-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03

INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03

SS-20 USIA-15 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 OIC-04 IO-14

AEC-11 OMB-01 DRC-01 /161 W  
----- 040853

R 211524Z MAR 74  
FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2111  
SECDEF WASHDC  
INFO USMISSION NATO  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USNMR SHAPE  
USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 VIENNA 2543

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS; FROM US REP MBFR

EO 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PARM, NATO  
SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: WESTERN STATEMENT AT 21 MARCH  
PLENARY MEETING

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF UK STATEMENT GIVEN ON BEHALF OF WESTERN  
REPS AT 21 MARCH PLENARY MEETING. THE TEXT, ADDRESSING PHASE I  
REDUCTIONS OF US/USSR GROUND FORCES, WAS APPROVED AT THE 20  
MARCH AGH MEETING. THE UK REP PRFACED HIS STATEMENT WITH AN  
EXPRESSION OF APPRECIATION TO THE AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT FOR ITS  
EFFORTS IN RENOVATING THE REDOUTENSAAL AT THE HOFBURG FOR  
CONFERENCE PURPOSES. THE FRG REP, WHO CHAIRED THE MEETING,  
EXTENDED A SIMILAR EXPRESSION OF APPRICIATION ON BEHALF OF ALL  
THE GOVERNMENTS REPRESENTED AT THE MBFR CONFERENCE.

BEGIN TEXT.  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 VIENNA 02543 01 OF 03 211656Z

1. IN THE COURSE OF THE EXCHANGES WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE SINCE THE RECESS, IT HAS BECOME APPARENT THAT THE TWO SIDES, ALTHOUGH SEPARATED BY CONSIDERABLE DIFFERENCES OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS, ARE AGREED IN FAVOURING A STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH TO REDUCTIONS. ON THE WESTERN SIDE, WE BELIEVE THAT THE RIGHT WAY TO MEET THIS COMMON REQUIREMENT IS TO HAVE SEPARATE BUT LINKED PHASES OF NEGOTIATION, RESULTING IN SEPARATE BUT LINKED REDUCTION AGREEMENTS LEADING TO AN AGREED ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE.

2. THE ACHIEVEMENT OF SATISFACTORY FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS WOULD CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE; AND THIS IN TURN WOULD CREATE MORE FAVOURABLE CONDITIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF A SUCCESSFUL SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS. OUR TASK, THEREFORE, IS TO FIND THE SIMPLEST AND MOST PRACTICAL WAY OF MAKING A START WITH REDUCTIONS. THIS MEANS PROCEEDING FROM SUCH POINTS OF AGREEMENT OR SIMILARITY AS ALREADY EXIST BETWEEN THE APPROACHES OF THE TWO SIDES.

3. IT IS OUR VIEW THAT FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS, IF THEY ARE TO BE EFFECTIVE IN INCREASING INTERNATIONAL CONFIDENCE, SHOULD BE MORE THAN MERELY TOKEN REDUCTIONS. WE THINK THAT THEY SHOULD BE A SUBSTANTIAL STEP TOWARDS THE OBJECTIVE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS - THE CREATION OF A MORE STABLE FORCE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST IN EUROPE WHICH WILL BE BOTH EQUITABLE AND DURABLE.

4. OUR PROPOSALS FOR FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THIS CONVICTION. AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE PROPOSED THAT FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS BE EFFECTED, ON THE SOVIET SIDE, BY THE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS OF A SPECIFIC SOVIET TANK ARMY IN THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, INCLUDING 68,000 TROOPS AND 1,700 TANKS. WE ESTIMATE THAT THIS WOULD INVOLVE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ABOUT 15 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA. THE UNITED STATES WOULD, FOR ITS PART, ALSO WITHDRAW FROM THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS ABOUT 15 PERCENT OF ITS TOTAL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA. THIS WOULD AMOUNT TO ABOUT 29,000 SOLDIERS. THESE AMERICAN SOLDIERS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN EITHER AS INDIVIDUALS OR IN UNITS, AND THEIR EQUIPMENT COULD BE STORED AND MAINTAINED IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT WOULD ALSO INCLUDE AGREEMENT ON THE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 VIENNA 02543 01 OF 03 211656Z

TINUATION OF NEGOTIATIONS IN A SECOND PHASE AND ON THE CONCEPT OF A COMMON CEILING.

5. AS WE HAVE MADE CLEAR, MY COLLEAGUES AND I BELIEVE IT TO BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE THAT THE REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE SHOULD BE INITIATED IN THIS WAY BY THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION. THERE ARE MANY GOOD REASONS FOR THIS. THESE TWO COUNTRIES BEAR A UNIQUE RESPONSIBILITY, BY

VIRTUE OF THE SCALE OF THEIR MILITARY RESOURCES AND OF THEIR STATUS AS MAJOR NUCLEAR POWERS, FOR THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE IN THE WORLD AND FOR THE LESSENING OF TENSIONS. THE REDUCTION OF THEIR FORCES WOULD, THEREFORE, BE AN ACT OF PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE FROM THE POLITICAL AS WELL AS FROM THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW.

6. THE CONCLUSION OF A SATISFACTORY FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, INCLUDING AGREEMENT ON THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT, AND LEADING TO SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES, WOULD, WE BELIEVE, BE WELCOMED BY OTHER COUNTRIES AS MARKING A FURTHER SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. SUCH AN IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE MOST POWERFUL COUNTRIES ON EITHER SIDE WOULD REDUCE TENSION AND THUS HELP TO CREATE THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS OF CONFIDENCE FOR THE INCLUSION IN SECOND PHASE REDUCTIONS OF THE FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. REDUCTIONS IN THE US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES ARE MOREOVER ENVISAGED IN THE APPROACHES OF BOTH SIDES, AND THUS REPRESENT AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF COMMON GROUND FROM WHICH TO PROCEED.

7. STARTING WITH US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS WOULD ALSO HAVE IMPORTANT PRACTICAL ADVANTAGES. SUCH REDUCTIONS WOULD RAISE FEWER POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL PROBLEMS AT THE OUTSET OF THESE COMPLEX NEGOTIATIONS THAN WOULD REDUCTIONS IN THE FORCES OF ALL THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. LIMITING OUR OBJECTIVE IN THE FIRST PHASE TO ACHIEVING REDUCTIONS IN US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES WOULD THEREFORE MAKE IT EASIER TO MEET THE DESIRE OF BOTH SIDES TO REACH AGREEMENT IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME.

MR CHAIRMAN,

8. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE ARGUED IN RECENT STATEMENTS  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 VIENNA 02543 01 OF 03 211656Z

THAT THE WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR PHASED REDUCTIONS IS INCONSISTENT WITH UNDERSTANDING REACHED IN THE PREPARATORY TALKS. THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOVIET UNION, FOR EXAMPLE, SAID ON 5 FEBRUARY THAT "ALL STATES ENTERING INTO THE CATEGORY OF POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS IN AGREEMENTS MUST PARTICIPATE IN THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN THE  
E E E E E E E

ADP000  
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 VIENNA 02543 02 OF 03 211916Z

50  
ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 ACDE-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03

INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03

SS-20 USIA-15 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 OIC-04 IO-14

AEC-11 OMB-01 DRC-01 /161 W  
----- 042758

R 211524Z MAR 74  
FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2112  
SECDEF WASHDC  
INFO USMISSION NATO  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USNMR SHAPE  
USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 VIENNA 2543

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS FROM US REP MBFR

9 MY COLLEAGUES AND I FIND THIS LINE OF ARGUMENT SURPRISING.  
I MUST MAKE IT CLEAR THAT AT NO TIME DURING THE PREPARATORY  
TALKS DID ANY WESTERN REPRESENTATIVE SAY OR AGREE TO ANYTHING  
WHICH COULD BE CONSTRUED AS BINDING EACH AND EVERY DIRECT  
PARTICIPANT COUNTRY TO INCLUDE ITS FORCES IN THE REDUCTIONS,  
STILL LESS TO INCLUDE THEM SIMULTANEOUSLY AND FROM THE OUTSET.  
THE MEANING OF THE DESIGNATION "POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS IN  
POSSIBLE AGREEMENTS" IS SIMPLY THAT THE COUNTRIES SO DESIGNATED  
ARE THOSE WHICH ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER BECOMING PARTIES TO  
THE AGREEMENTS TO WHICH THE PRESENT NEGOTITIONS MAY LEAD. AS  
FOR THE WORD "MUTUAL" IN THE AGREED TITLE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS,  
IT MEANS SIMPLY THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE ABOUT THE REDUCTION OF  
THE ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OF THE TWO SIDES IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

10. THE PURPOSE OF MY REMARKS ON THIS POINT IS TO SET THE  
RECORD STRAIGHT, NOT TO STRIKE A NEGATIVE NOTE. THE GOVERNMENTS  
CONFIDENTIAL  
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 VIENNA 02543 02 OF 03 211916Z

WHICH MY COLLEAGUES AND I REPRESENT HAVE AT NO TIME EXPRESSED  
UNWILLINGNESS TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES. ON THE CONTRARY, WE HAVE  
PUT FORWARD CLEAR PROPOSALS FOR PHASE REDUCTIONS OF FORCES ON  
BOTH SIDES; AND WE HAVE EMPHASIZED THAT, FOLLOWING A SATIS-  
FACTORY FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD INCLUDE AGREEMENT ON  
THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT, THERE SHOULD BE A SECOND PHASE OF  
NEGOTIATIONS IN ORDER TO COMPLETE MOVEMENT OF THE PROPOSED  
COMMON CEILING. THE COMMON CEILING WOULD COVER ALL THE GROUND  
FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, AND THE SECOND PHASE OF  
NEGOTIATIONS WOULD, ON THE WESTERN SIDE, FOCUS ON THE GROUND

FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

11. THE CONCEPT OF PHASED REDUCTIONS HAS ALL ALONG BEEN A MAJOR ELEMENT IN THE WESTERN POSITION. WE BELIEVE IT TO BE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE STATEMENT IN THE 28 JUNE COMMUNIQUE THAT: "SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS WILL HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY WORKED OUT IN SCOPE AND TIMING IN SUCH A WAY THAT THEY WILL IN ALL RESPECTS AND AT EVERY POINT CONFORM TO THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR EACH PARTY".

12. IT HAS I THINK BECOME CLEAR THAT, ON A NUMBER OF INDIVIDUAL POINTS BEARING ON THE TOPIC OF US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS, THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO SIDES DO NOT IN FACT APPEAR TO BE FAR APART.

13. ON THE IMPORTANT QUESTION OF NUMBERS, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE EASTERN SIDE SHOULD FIND THE NUMBERS WE HAVE PROPOSED FOR FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS EXCESSIVE. WE CALCULATE THAT THE NUMBER OF SOVIET TROOPS WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE WITHDRAWN UNDER THE EASTERN PROPOSALS IS LARGER THAN THAT ENVISAGED IN OUR OWN FIRST PHASE PROPOSALS; AND ALTHOUGH THE NUMBER OF SOVIET TANKS WHICH WOULD BE WITHDRAWN UNDER OUR FIRST PHASE PROPOSALS IS SLIGHTLY GREATER THAN THE NUMBER WHICH WE CALCULATE THAT THE EASTERN APPROACH WOULD INVOLVE, THE ORDER OF MAGNITUDE IS ABOUT THE SAME.

14. THE EASTERN APPROACH PROVIDES FOR FORCES TO BE WITHDRAWN IN UNITS AND WE ASSUME, THEREFORE, THAT THE EASTERN SIDE WOULD NOT IN PRINCIPLE EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF WITHDRAWING A SOVIET TANK ARMY.

15. WE DO NOT SEE HOW THE WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY WOULD  
CONFIDENTIAL  
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 VIENNA 02543 02 OF 03 211916Z

DIMINISH EASTERN SECURITY, SINCE IT SEEMS TO US THAT THIS COULD BE ADEQUATELY ENSURED AT A FAR LOWER LEVEL OF GROUND FORCES THAN THAT AT PRESENT MAINTAINED BY THE EAST IN THE AREA OF REDUCTION. EVEN AFTER THE FIRST PHASE WITHDRAWALS WE HAVE PROPOSED, THE RATIO BETWEEN THE NUMBERS OF TANKS ON EACH SIDE WOULD STILL BE MORE THAN 2:1 IN FAVOUR OF THE EAST. THE EASTERN SIDE HAS CLAIMED THE RIGHT TO DECIDE FOR ITSELF WHAT LEVEL OF FORCES IS ADEQUATE FOR ITS OWN DEFENCE. BUT A STABLE EQUILIBRIUM IN GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD MINIMISE THE RISK THAT A WAR MIGHT START, AND THEREFY WOULD PROVIDE THE GREATEST SECURITY FOR ALL; AND SUCH AN EQUILIBRIUM WILL ONLY RESULT FROM AN AGREEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES. TO CREATE THE CONDITIONS OF CONFIDENCE IN WHICH OUR NEGOTIATIONS CAN BE BROUGHT TO THIS SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION, A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN SOVIET TANKS IS NEEDED.

16. IT IS TRUE THAT THE REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET FORCES WE HAVE PROPOSED ARE LARGER, BOTH IN MEN AND IN MATERIAL, THAN THOSE WE HAVE PROPOSED FOR US FORCES. WE BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE ADEQUATELY

DEMONSTRATED THAT IN VIEW OF THE EXISTING IMBALANCES IN MANPOWER, GEOGRAPHY AND TANKS, A REDUCTION AGREEMENT UNDER WHICH THIS WAS NOT THE CASE WOULD DIMINISH SECURITY AND DAMAGE STABILITY.

17. WE HAVE PROPOSED THAT THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE THE CREATION OF A COMMON CEILING IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER. SINCE THE EXISTING LEVELS ARE UNEQUAL, EQUALITY CANNOT BE REACHED UNLESS EASTERN REDUCTIONS ARE LARGER THAN THOSE OF THE WEST. MOREOVER, THERE ARE STRONG REASONS WHY REDUCTIONS SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN EXACTLY THE SAME WAY ON EACH SIDE.

18. THE GEOGRAPHICAL FACTOR IS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE IN THIS CONTEXT. THE GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITY BETWEEN WEST AND EAST IS NOT A WESTERN INVENTION: ITS EXISTENCE AND ITS EFFECTS ARE, AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA RECOGNISED IN HIS STATEMENT ON THE 14TH OF MARCH, OBJECTIVE FACTS. THE FACT THAT THIS GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITY HAS ALWAYS BEEN KNOWN TO EXIST BY BOTH SIDES DOES NOT IN ANY WAY DECREASE ITS SIGNIFICANCE. NOR DOES THE FACT THAT IT WILL CONTINUE TO EXIST, WHATEVER MAY BE THE FORCE LEVELS ON EITHER

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 VIENNA 02543 03 OF 03 211840Z

50

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 ACDE-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03

INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03

SS-20 USIA-15 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 OIC-04 IO-14

AEC-11 OMB-01 DRC-01 /161 W

----- 042263

R 211524Z MAR 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2113

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 VIENNA 2543

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

SIDE, RENDER IT IRRELEVANT. ON THE CONTRARY, IT IS FUNDAMENTAL IN DETERMINING WHAT FORCE REDUCTIONS WOULD BE EQUITABLE. IN VIEW OF ITS IMPORTANCE, AND OF THE DOUBT THAT HAS BEEN THROWN ON ITS VALIDITY AND ITS RELEVANCE TO THE SUBJECT MATTER OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS BY SOME EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES, I SHOULD LIKE TO REMIND YOU BRIEFLY OF ITS BEING ON OUR NEGOTIATIONS.

19. THE DISTANCE OVER WHICH AMERICAN FORCES WOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS IS NECESSARILY VERY MUCH GREATER THAN THE DISTANCE OVER WHICH SOVIET FORCES WOULD NEED TO BE WITHDRAWN. IT IS, OF COURSE, ONLY TO BE EXPECTED THAT THE UNITED STATES, LIKE THE SOVIET UNION, HAVING FORCES STATIONED IN CENTRAL EUROPE, SHOULD DO WHATEVER LIES WITHIN HER POWER TO ASSURE EFFECTIVE LINES OF COMMUNICATION FOR THOSE FORCES. BUT  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 VIENNA 02543 03 OF 03 211840Z

MODERN MEANS OF COMMUNICATION CANNOT ELIMINATE THE DISADVANTAGES RESULTING FROM SO GREAT A DISPARITY AS THAT BETWEEN THE RELATIVE LENGTH, SECURITY AND CONVENIENCE OF THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION AVAILABLE TO THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. AN AGREEMENT ON FORCE REDUCTIONS WHICH FAILED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR, AND WHICH IMPOSED IDENTICAL CONDITIONS ON US AND SOVIET WITHDRAWALS, COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AN EQUITABLE AGREEMENT. IT WOULD GIVE A ONE-SIDED ADVANTAGE TO THE EAST, AND WOULD THUS FAIL TO MEET THE CRITERION OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. THIS IS WHY WE HAVE PROPOSED THAT US SOLDIERS COULD BE WITHDRAWN EITHER AS INDIVIDUALS OR IN UNITS, AND THAT THEIR EQUIPMENT COULD BE STORED IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

20. IN SPEAKING OF THE GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR, WE DO NOT HAVE IN MIND THE SECURITY OF THE US AND USSR ALONE. ALL WESTERN PARTICIPANTS MUST BE CONCERNED WITH THE SITUATION IN EUROPE ARISING FROM THE DISPARITIES IN GEOGRAPHY AND IN THE EXISTING FORCE RELATIONSHIP TO WHICH OUR PROPOSALS ARE ADDRESSED. ANY AGREEMENTS REACHED HERE MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE SECURITY OF ALL PARTICIPANTS; THEREFORE THEY MUST ALSO SAFEGUARD, AND NOT DIMINISH, THE SECURITY OF THE FLANK COUNTRIES. IT WOULD BE SELF-DEFEATING TO THE PURPOSE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS IF IMPROVEMENTS IN STABILITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE WERE TO BE OFFSET BY INCREASED TENSIONS ELSEWHERE.

21. IN SEEKING TO IDENTIFY COMMON GROUND BETWEEN THE APPROACH OF THE EASTERN SIDE AND OUR OWN FIRST PHASE PROPOSALS ON THE QUESTION OF US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS, I HAVE SPOKEN SO FAR OF NUMBERS AND EQUIPMENT. THERE ARE SOME ADDITIONAL AREAS IN WHICH

WE BELIEVE IT WOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT TO DEVELOP A COMMON APPROACH. ONE SUCH AREA IS THE QUESTION OF THE TIMING OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS. WE ENVISAGE THAT THIS WOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, AND THAT THESE PROVISIONS WOULD ESTABLISH AN AGREED TIME-TABLE FOR CARRYING OUT THE AGREED REDUCTIONS AND THE APPROPRIATE ASSOCIATED MEASURES, AND WOULD PROVIDE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS TIMETABLE TO START PROMPTLY AFTER THE AGREEMENT CAME INTO EFFECT.

2. FOR OUR PART, MY COLLEAGUES AND I WOULD BE READY TO REACH A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF US AND SOVIET  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 VIENNA 02543 03 OF 03 211840Z

GROUND FORCES DURING 1974. THE BASIS ON WHICH WE ARE PREPARED TO DO THIS IS INDICATED IN THE WESTERN OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS TABLED ON 22 NOVEMBER 1974. WE BELIEVE THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT COULD PROCEED RELATIVELY QUICKLY, AND THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE US WITHDRAWALS FOR WHICH IT PROVIDES TO BE MADE AT LEAST AS RAPIDLY AS THE WITHDRAWALS OF SOVIET FORCES. THE ACTUAL TIMING OF WITHDRAWALS WILL, OF COURSE, DEPEND PRIMARILY ON HOW QUICKLY AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED ON THEIR SUBSTANCE. THE SOONER A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT IS CONCLUDED, THE SOONER IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO BEGIN WITHDRAWALS OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT.

23. IT IS A FURTHER POINT OF SIMILARITY BETWEEN THE APPROACHES OF THE TWO SIDES THAT BOTH APPEAR TO CONTEMPLATE THE IMPOSITION UNDER THE TERMS OF AN AGREEMENT REDUCING US AND SOVIET FORCES, OF CEILINGS ON US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCE MANPOWER REMAINING IN THE AREA.

24. IT APPEARS ALSO THAT THE EASTERN SIDE SHARES OUR VIEW THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD REQUIRE LIMITS TO BE PUT ON THE FREEDOM OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION TO INTRODUCE GROUND FORCE MANPOWER INTO THE AREA, WHETHER FOR THE PURPOSE OF REPLACEMENT, ROTATION OR EXERCISES. IT MUST ALSO BE APPARENT TO BOTH SIDES THAT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE AGREED EXCEPTIONS TO SUCH LIMITS IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION TO SATISFY THEIR LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS FOR REPLACING, ROTATING AND EXERCISING THEIR FORCES IN THE AREA.

MR CHAIRMAN,

25. I WOULD URGE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS TO CONSIDER VERY CAREFULLY THE POINTS WHICH I HAVE MADE TODAY. OUR DISCUSSIONS OVER THE LAST FIVE MONTHS HAVE ILLUSTRATED ALL TOO CLEARLY HOW DIFFICULT AND SENSITIVE THE SUBJECT MATTER OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS



IS. OUR EXCHANGES HAVE OFTEN TENDED TO THROW THE EMPHASIS  
ON THE DIFFERENCES WHICH SEPARATE THE APPROACHES OF THE TWO  
SIDES, RATHER THAN ON THOSE AREAS WHERE SOME AGREEMENT OR  
SIMILARITY EXISTS BETWEEN THEM. IN MY STATEMENT TODAY, I  
HAVE INDICATED SOME AREAS IN WHICH OUR FIRST PHASE PROPOSALS  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 VIENNA 02543 03 OF 03 211840Z

AND THE EASTERN APPROACH SEEM TO US TO COINCIDE. MY COLLEAGUES  
AND I BELIEVE THAT, SMALL THOUGH THESE ELEMENTS OF AGREE-  
MENT MAY SEEM TO BE, THEY POINT TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A  
FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT BASED ON THE PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD BY THE  
WESTERN PARTICIPANTS ON 22 NOVEMBER LAST YEAR.  
AND WE BELIEVE THAT THESE PROPOSALS PROVIDE THE MOST REALISTIC  
AND EFFECTIVE STARTING POINT FOR THE PROCESS OF FORCE  
REDUCTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. END TEXT.TRINKA

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, TROOP REDUCTIONS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 21 MAR 1974  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** golinofr  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1974VIENNA02543  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D740060-0397  
**From:** VIENNA  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1974/newtext/t19740324/aaaaawtx.tel  
**Line Count:** 458  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION ACDA  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 9  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** golinofr  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 26 MAR 2002  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <26 MAR 2002 by worrelsw>; APPROVED <06 MAY 2002 by golinofr>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: WESTERN STATEMENT AT 21 MARCH PLENARY MEETING  
**TAGS:** PARM, UK, UR, US, NATO  
**To:** STATE DOD  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005